The Great Economic War (GEW) (Part 12: Geopolitical Go)
Phuah Eng Chye (31 December 2022)
Though US and China are the two main players, it is an error to frame the GEW as a Cold War or Thucydides Trap. The US, as the reigning hegemon, is naturally interested in maintaining status quo and finds it politically expedient to frame the geopolitical conflict as a binary choice between democracy and authoritarian regimes so as to galvanise its allies. China and Russia instead acknowledge their inability to challenge for global leadership and to take over the reins. The latter stance is probably more realistic as the likelihood is that no single country will be able achieve the unipolar power possessed by the US in coming next decades – largely because global economic power has already been dispersed.
Cheng Yawen notes “in 1980, developed countries accounted for 78.9 percent of global GDP, while developing countries accounted for only 21 percent; in 2021, developed countries’ share of global GDP falls to 57.8 percent, while developing countries’ share rises to 42.2 percent. The combined GDP share of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) plus Turkey, South Korea, and Indonesia in terms of purchasing power parity increases from 18 percent of the global economy in 1992 to 37.36 percent in 2021, while the G7 countries decline from 51 percent to 44 percent in the same period…Trade between China and Africa increased 22.6 times between 1997 and 2010, and trade with Latin America increased 22 times; by 2021, China-Africa and China-Latin America trade will increase another 2 times and 2.5 times, respectively, compared to 2010. in 2000, China-Arab trade was only $15.2 billion, and by 2018 it reached $244.3 billion, an increase of 16 times in less than 20 years. Brazil’s trade with Arab countries increased fourfold from 2003 to 2010, while trade with Africa increased fivefold to a total of $26 billion, a figure higher than Brazil’s trade with traditional trading partners such as Germany or Japan; by 2019, Brazil’s trade with Arab countries and Africa increased 0.98 times and 0.68 times, respectively, compared to 2010. Since 2001, India’s trade with Africa has grown at an average annual rate of 17.2%, with 2.26 times more in 2021 than in 2011. India’s trade with Latin America and Middle East and North African countries has experienced similar growth. Both mutual trade and investment between emerging economies such as India and Brazil are also heating up rapidly, with trade volumes among developing countries growing faster than the global average growth rate, while trade exchanges with developed countries continue to decline, and the division of labor and cooperation among these countries in the production of primary and industrial goods replicates the historical globalized exchange of material goods”.
The transition to a multipolarity future
The multipolar future is affirmed by the rise of several developing countries among the top 20 economies. China has risen to second and India to fifth and they are slated to become first and third in a decade. Other Global South members such as Russia (9), Iran (11), Brazil (12), Indonesia (17), Saudi (18), and Turkey (20) have the potential to improve their positions. Collectively, the economic influence of the US and OECD is likely to continue to wane despite efforts to reindustrialise while China’s share of global production and consumption may also have peaked. This augurs a multipolar future where global growth is no longer dependent on Western economies and China and will most likely be driven by the rest of the Global South.
In the meantime, the US is struggling with the erosion of its unipolar leadership. Philip Pilkington relates “in 1956 the British sensed, correctly, that if they fought for the Suez Canal and lost this would precipitate a sharp decline in British influence in the world. Today America senses something very similar with respect to Taiwan. This feeling has built up in Washington because of what can only be described as the dismal failure of U.S. foreign policy strategy in Europe…America’s initial plan for its Pacific strategy closely tracked Eden’s initial plan for Egypt: the key was to get allies on board. If America could unite the rest of the West against China, then it could ensure a similar response to any Chinese incursion into Taiwan as we saw when Russia invaded Ukraine. This spoke to a broader strategy that we might call Cold War 2.0, in which America seemed to think that the West could form a new trade and military bloc that would face off against the strengthened and expanded BRICS+ alliance that we have seen emerge in recent months. The Cold War 2.0 strategy appears to have collapsed as quickly as it emerged. The rapidity of the collapse relates to the fallout from the Russo-Ukraine war. European leaders continue to maintain support for the sanctions against Russia, but only because they are locked in on the policy. In private they know that the sanctions have been a disaster and are the reason why Europe faces an unprecedented energy crisis and even, potentially, deindustrialization. It is not surprising, then, that Europeans do not intend to repeat the mistake…The response to America’s Cold War 2.0 overtures has been remarkably like those to the British pleas for American engagement in Egypt in 1956: thanks, but no thanks. In 1956, the Americans did not want to intervene on the side of the British because they saw that the world was changing. Britain could no longer afford to maintain its global empire intact and the Americans realized that, moving forward, this would result in the proliferation of nationalist regimes in former British colonies. The Americans understood that leaders like Nasser may occasionally be troublesome, but ultimately, they were the only game in town moving forward”.
Samuel Gardner-Bird observe many in the Global South see “Washington’s unipolar leadership of the world diminishing” and are critical of “the double standards of the U.S.-backed rules-based order”. These sentiments “point to the emergence of a new non-alignment within the Global South, a counterpoint to America’s typical posture of world leadership…if prominent leaders in the fastest growing regions don’t buy into the Western consensus, can the United States really maintain its global position for long? He argues “if Washington has any hope of winning over the Global South, it must come to terms with the non-aligned posture of many states. Centering U.S. grand strategy on strategic competition and making states pick a side, through onerous tools such as secondary sanctions, will only push them toward Beijing or Moscow. Showing up as a partner for greater trade, investment, and innovation may be more effective. The United States should also look to reform the international system by enhancing the importance of the G20 and pursuing a more inclusive UN Security Council – an idea Washington has proposed for decades. But before any of this can occur, the United States would have to admit the obvious – the age of unipolarity is over, the world will not accept rules made in Washington, and that developing nations are once again charting their own course. If it fails to do so, it is doomed to pursue a grandiose vision of the world that will neither enhance the security of Americans, nor improve the lives of billions of citizens in the Global South”.
The transition from a unipolar to multipolar regime is in progress. Hence, while the US has managed to “rally” its OECD allies, the reticence of the Global South to support the West came as a surprise. In this regard, countries that perceive a multipolar future will see no reason to overturn their long-standing or even new relationships with Russia or/and China to side with a fickle-minded West. Global South countries have become more assertive in pursuing their own interests and have sought to balance their geopolitical relationships and dependencies to ensure no country becomes too powerful. However, they will be careful to avoid upsetting the US. In other words, developing countries will bend but not break their relationships with Russia and China.
Rajan Menon notes “many other countries simply preferred not to get sucked into a confrontation between Russia and the West”. “India’s foreign minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, highlighted such sentiments…remarked that Europe has to grow out of the mindset that [its] problems are the world’s problem, but the world’s problems are not Europe’s problem.” Given how singularly silent European countries had been on many things which were happening, for example in Asia…you could ask why anybody in Asia would trust Europe on anything at all?”
For the Global South, economic factors outweigh geopolitics or military factors. First, if they join Western sanctions on Russia and China, they would be cutting off major sources of critical imports (such as oil, fertilisers from Russia) and giving up access to trade, investments, infrastructure, finance and technology from China. The collateral damage suffered by Europe provides an illustration of the heavy economic costs of supporting sanctions. Second, while OECD countries get preferred treatment, developing countries will, as usual, be left in the lurch. Third, on the other hand, if developing countries continue to purchase Russian oil and install Huawei networks, they benefit from discounts and assured supplies rather than have to compete for limited “non-sanctioned” Western supplies.
Changing global trends also suggest the Global South should reduce its reliance on the West. As OECD countries increasingly seek self-sufficiency and reindustrialise, opportunities for developing countries to adopt the export-led industrialisation model built on Western consumption will diminish. The transformation of the US from being the world’s largest oil importer to becoming the largest exporter positioned it as a competitor to the Middle East while there is an imperative to strengthen relations with China which has become as the largest importer. The Global South can no longer count on the West as a reliable source of trade, finance, technology, weapons and safe assets because they now come attached with geopolitical conditionalities which can be imposed due to weaponisation of values.
The key issue is therefore how the West would cope with a more assertive Global South given the intensifying competition for relationships, production, resources and markets. Their options are limited in that today no single country could conduct large-scale conquest to secure supplies and markets or naval blockades to cut off an adversary’s supplies. This is because modern warfare is largely fought with highly destructive missiles and this acts as a deterrent to direct military conflict. Today, military force is an important backstop to project global power but its role in supporting pursuit of economic objectives has shrunk considerably.
Modern geopolitical conflict is largely fought in the information realm. The West has relied on sanctions as its main tool but the US allies appears to have been suffered considerable damage in the geopolitical crossfire. Therefore, the Global South prefers to be non-aligned to keep their options open. Recent developments suggest OECD members are directly reaching out to the Global South to bypass the US-China-Russia standoff. The geopolitical conflict will therefore turn into a dynamic bargaining game for alliances.
If a bipolar conflict is comparable to a chess game, the more suitable comparison for a multipolar geopolitical contest is Go. Go is described as “an adversarial game with the objective of surrounding a larger total area of the board with one’s stones than the opponent. As the game progresses, the players position stones on the board to map out formations and potential territories. Contests between opposing formations are often extremely complex and may result in the expansion, reduction, or wholesale capture and loss of formation stones…The general strategy is to expand one’s territory, attack the opponent’s weak groups (groups that can be killed), and always stay mindful of the life status of one’s own groups…Strategy deals with global influence, interaction between distant stones, keeping the whole board in mind during local fights, and other issues that involve the overall game”.
The opening phase of Geopolitical Go can be considered to have started after the earlier Russian incursions into Ukraine and the launch of decoupling with China. These events prompted players to make preparatory moves and position their “stones” to enhance their ability to control the game and in anticipation of major conflagrations. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and GEW marked a shift into the middle game characterised by outbreaks of direct fighting in contested areas. This is an escalatory phase, with deep tactical incursions guided by attacking and defensive strategies.
The basic strategies of Geopolitical Go revolve around the shaping of alliances. Superpowers weave alliances by positioning their stones (MNCs, military, economic policies) to expand their space and restrict the adversary’s space. Players seek to strengthen the cohesiveness of and expand the size of their alliances while disrupting the adversary’s alliance. Strategies may also require trade-offs – the sacrifice of some stones to gain an advantage elsewhere.
The modern geopolitical landscape is multipolar and multiplayer; and most battles take place in the information rather than physical realm. This leads to chaotic and escalatory conditions because players tend to attack in areas where they have an asymmetric advantage. Hence, the US exploits its asymmetric advantages in terms of its geopolitical alliances, its military coverage, and its leadership in technology and finance. Russia leverages on its energy and resources. China leverages on its industrial production efficiency and scale. In asymmetric warfare, players do not easily cede ground because they receive little benefits for concessions and end up at a perpetual disadvantage. Asymmetric warfare tends to provoke over-reactions; with countries tending to “harden the terrain” in spaces where they operate at an asymmetric disadvantage to eliminate the adversary’s leverage. The current geopolitical conflict has much in common with the chaos of the Warring States or the Three Kingdoms in ancient China.
It is too early to make a call on the endgame; if ever there is one in an infinite game. In a sense, “winning” is associated with expanding control over space and capturing the adversary’s stones. But geopolitical Go is comparable to an infinite game where the boundaries are constantly changing, the number of participants and realms are continually expanding and a “final victory” is elusive. if there is no such thing as a final victory, then it raises questions as to what the players are fighting for.
Alliance strategies at the core of the multipolar game
Geopolitical strategies should be viewed within the context of the big picture for alliances. Arta Moeini, David Polansky and Coleman Hopkins points out the US celebrates its alliances “as the veritable instrument of the United States’ power and prestige around the globe as well as the cornerstone of the U.S.-led liberal international order”. “Maintaining the extensive and global network of U.S. alliances is a sacred cow of American national security strategy. For many decades now, the foreign policy establishment has viewed America’s overseas commitments as inseparable from the national interest, such that a true cost-benefit analysis is rarely undertaken. While the existing multi-regional alliance complex could be traced back to the bipolar structure of the Cold War and its certain militarization with the Korean War, the utopian quest for liberal hegemony under unipolarity provided a rationale for maintaining these arrangements, even absent a global hegemonic foe (as was the Soviet Union). The upshot is Washington continues to reflexively celebrate America’s alliances (most of which it has inherited) as vectors for U.S. power, international prestige, and global primacy – regularly overlooking or downplaying their risks, such as entrapment in foreign conflicts or a nuclear confrontation. The end of America’s unipolar moment, characterized by superpower decay and the rise of multiple regional powers, poses challenges to the status quo and creates opportunities to re-examine the logic of maintaining the existing alliance structure”.
Arta Moeini, David Polansky and Coleman Hopkins notes “it is true that, at least on the surface, the United States also receives certain real-world benefits that, in the mind of the advocates of primacy, justify sustaining (and when possible expanding) these alliances: the U.S. foreign policy establishment can often leverage the alliance – and Washington’s principal role in them – to impact and shape the policies of the many countries dependent on U.S. guarantees, not to mention America’s many military bases in the world’s various regional strategic theaters. In other words, as global networks, America’s international alliances institutionalize U.S. primacy around the world, which makes them attractive to most factions (primacists, liberal internationalists, and institutionalists) in the national security establishment and forming a general consensus about their value. Nevertheless, this hard – if broad – material calculus often masks what Washington actually gains from these arrangements, sidestepping the question of whether maintaining these security arrangements in faraway regions of the world meaningfully contributes to making America safer at home. Put differently, it overshadows the largely symbolic and ceremonial role the alliances play for the American foreign-policy establishment as a psychological (and in many cases institutional) reinforcer of American leadership or hegemonic position”.
In this context, “this situation has left the United States increasingly unable to manage its alliances in a manner that serves its national interests. For, in a multipolar world, in which civilizational middle powers are becoming central actors, America’s alliances are more likely to serve the interest of a group of smaller, peripheral states called regional balancers (e.g., Ukraine, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Taiwan, among others) rather than outside great powers”. Arta Moeini, David Polansky and Coleman Hopkins argue “like the Trojan Horse of fame in Greek history, the true purpose of alliances of this kind is initially disguised and misleading – for the interests and the power of the stronger ally (i.e., the U.S.) end up serving the weaker partner. Free-riding and buck-passing are inherent and unavoidable features of these asymmetric alliances, given the preponderance of power enjoyed by the United States and the stark, and even existential, stakes for the peripheral regional state which regularly pushes for a more active U.S. presence. The consequence of these alliances is routinization of moral hazard, threat inflation and zero-sum framings of local conflicts, U.S. global interventionism, and constraints on U.S. strategic autonomy”.
Arta Moeini, David Polansky and Coleman Hopkins argues “the United States’ military alliance networks are relics of the Cold War…these alliance systems calcify an outdated maximalist mindset (in a feedback loop spiral), impeding the strategic flexibility that Washington needs to operate within the new geopolitical realities shaped by the rise of China and the (re-) emergence of key world regions as loci of conflict”. “Seeking interest-based alternatives to alliance formation is not a call for isolationism but for developing a more common-sensical, prudent, and realist approach to America’s alliances that judges them based on how they align with and serve a narrower and more concrete definition of American security”.
Arta Moeini, David Polansky and Coleman Hopkins notes “in the wake of ebbing unipolarity and the decline of American global hegemony, the international system is undergoing a fundamental transformation, reverting to a less globalized condition characterized by multiplicity and regionalism. This post-global and regional shift in geopolitics re-focuses security around core civilizational states in multiple world regions: this grouping of states – labeled middle powers – are juxtaposed with great powers (with the latter differentiated by their capacity for trans-regional action owing to their global force projection capability). Each middle power anchors a regional security complex. These systemic trends highlight the local nature of conflict and security imperatives. That is, in the post-global era defined by increasing multipolarity, regions become fundamental, and security challenges and arrangements will consequently be adjudicated by proximal actors in local settings at the fault lines between civilizations. In effect, what many conceive as a unitary international system is increasingly revealed to be an open multi-system, with various systemic complexes working independently but not in a vacuum”.
Key elements of alliance strategies include securing allies that add a meaningful weight (economic, geographical or strategic strengths) and ensuring allies are united, aligned and cohesive as this would enhance power projection. The US seems to have adopted “tight and close” strategies. “Tight” strategies are based on heightening geopolitical tensions at a fast tempo to convince allies that political-military alignment and economic sacrifices are crucial to neutralising the long-term threat from Russia and China. The “close” strategy is to ring-fence the affluent, stable and technologically-sophisticated nations (OECD) within its coalition and to use access to its “blue-ribbon” sphere as a carrot or stick to convince third countries they are better off aligning with the OECD agenda. The exclusion of “unstable” and “unreliable” adversaries is a form of divide-and-rule; deploying disruptive tactics to isolate adversaries and ensure they are unable to coordinate and combine their strengths against the West. The US containment strategy is intended to saddle their adversaries with the challenge of managing an alliance of unstable nations with radically diverse ideologies.
In contrast, China and Russia seems to have adopted “loose and open” strategies. This is more suitable because unlike the US which is the undisputed leader in OECD, China is seen as a leading but otherwise is generally not accepted as the unchallenged leader of the Global South. Hence, their alliances can only be sustained through “loose” principles such as non-interference and non-alignment and an “open” approach that permits partner countries to maintain their relationships with adversaries. This is a pragmatic recognition that most Global South countries need to maintain their relationships with the West even as they come under considerable pressure to choose sides. Hence, the main attraction of China and Russia is that they are bargaining chips that can be used to resist Western pressure and provide a fallback to countries that offend the West.
Recent events can be viewed from the perspective of alliance strategies. Sergey Glazyev argues “after failing to weaken the People’s Republic of China head-on through a trade war, the Americans shifted the main blow to Russia, which they see as a weak link in world geopolitics and economics. The Anglo-Saxons are striving to realize their age-old Russophobic ideas of destroying our country, and at the same time weakening China, because the strategic alliance of the Russian Federation and China is too tough for the United States. They have neither the economic nor military power to destroy us together, and not separately”. For the same reason, China and Russia announced a “no limits” relationship as they are aware that “when the lips are gone, the teeth are cold”.
In response to the pointed and fast-paced US tactical jabs, China has chosen has adopted the tai-chi strategies of being formless and to yield. Formless means adopting a non-distinct geopolitical policy. This allows China to stay out of the fray for as long as possible as rivals and others wear each out. In the meantime, China stays in defensive mode to re-organise and strengthen its domestic economy and international relationships. Yield doesn’t mean surrender. In tai-chi, to yield is to absorb the enemy’s force and to use it against them. Hence, China has been seemingly acquiescent in the face of recent US escalation on Taiwan and on technology. It is quite likely they are bidding their time, taking a measure of the impact and will launch a counter-strike at later time.
Generally, Global South countries recognise the strength of the West and are treading carefully by not openly defying Western sanctions to avoid provoking a strong reaction. Thus, Chinese banks have retreated from dealing with Russian banks and curtailed supplying technology. It is likely that most transactions with Russia will be informal. In the meantime, Global South countries are attempting to neutralise the potential “threats” from the West by seeking largesse and assistance from China and increasing trade and investments among themselves to minimise potential losses regardless of the outcomes of the geopolitical conflict.
In my view, the West has the advantage but time and trend is working against them. While the US won the battle for strategic alignment, nonetheless the collateral damage and enforcement costs to OECD are mounting and anti-Russia and anti-China fatigue is setting in. The onus is on the US to achieve results quickly –accelerate decoupling and reindustrialisation. Otherwise, the OECD will be tied down by their vulnerabilities to Chinese retaliation and defection risks will rise. In this regard, the lack of visibility on how the OECD moves forward post-decoupling is a disconcerting sign.
Russia and China need to withstand the current economic onslaught. If Russia or China weakens, this will increase the pressure on Global South countries to cave in to the threat of Western sanctions. In this regard, Russia and China can bid their time and focus on re-routing its economic “circulation” from the OECD to the Global South.
On alliances, China will keep the door “open” as long as possible with OECD and use its considerable resources and goodwill to woo countries such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Indonesia. Russia leads the way in building the coalition among sanctioned countries like Iran, North Korea and Venezuela and leveraging on countries that are reluctant to ally with China and where it has a strong historical relationship such as India. At some stage, China and Russia would likely launch countermeasures against decoupling, possibly when the West is midway through supply chain relocation. It will be game-changing if China break through the technology chokeholds and achieve semiconductor self-sufficiency. This would free them to launch more aggressive counter-strikes.
Economics of fragmentation
In the past, it was possible to manage the global economy with a small-group of like-minded countries such as G7. Today, with the dispersion of economic power, a larger and diverse group such as G20 is the multipolar reality. Therefore, geopolitical conflicts will be dominated by alliance strategies and the economics of fragmentation.
Prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the application of US sanctions was limited. But the GEW triggered the imposition of a comprehensive range of sanctions with their impact amplified by the participation of OECD countries. This was justified on the basis of weakening Russia’s military capabilities and undermining civilian support for its military operation.
On China, the initial tariff war and attacks on ZTE and Huawei were also limited in scope. In particular, businesses saw decoupling as temporary and that both nations would reach an amicable solution in recognition of the high interdependencies. However, the US government successfully overcame resistance from businesses and allies, and suddenly made considerable progress in decoupling. If China emerged relatively unscathed during the earlier phase, the recent Western crackdowns on technology, supply chains and cross-border investments is now cutting deeply into the Chinese economy.
The emergence of a multipolar landscape is being accompanied by malicious beggar-thy-neighbour policies that are fragmenting the global economy. A recent example is the sweeping US “October 7” restrictions on the export of advanced semiconductor manufacturing technology to China. In tandem with this, there has been political pressure on US MNCs based in China not to purchase Chinese semiconductors; even if these were used products to be sold in the China market. These measures now create uncertainties as to whether the US could, one day, extend the export ban to the sale of chips or related products in China. Similarly, China could decide to prohibit the use of these chips in China or its consumers could boycott related products. Once we extrapolate from past actions, it is likely that the fissure of technology and supply chains will be broad (across many technologies and products) and deep. There could also be a replication of some of the Russian sanctions – covering shipping and aviation logistics, digital infrastructure, finance and even tourism. The multilateral trade regime is being upended; particularly with the US ignoring multilateral processes and preferring instead to formulate alternative “friendshoring-based” trade regimes such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework to push supply chain restructuring, achieve “clean” networks and to launch competing infrastructure initiatives.
Fragmentation implies the reshaping of the global economy will be based on national self-interests. The degree of deglobalisation will worsen. As both sides progress towards achieving greater self-sufficiency, this will give them confidence to become more aggressive. In the next phase of fragmentation, the West could escalate secondary sanction pressures on the Global South. Rather than get caught in the dependency in the saturated Western markets, the Global South is likely to pursue “globalisation” based on their internal circulation dynamics given they now have a sufficient base of resources, markets and capital. In this context, the potential exit of OECD MNCs will be welcomed as it creates space for eager Global South companies to grow. In the meantime, Russia and China seem to be preparing to retaliate in a major counter-offensive in the economic war.
In any case, the consequences of GEW, where government policies are overriding markets, are starting to become apparent – supply interruptions, pricing inefficiencies and volatility, dwindling “market-driven” investments, de-dollarisation, technology and legal bifurcation, data localisation and financial instability. The global supply chains are suffering considerable damage but the new capacity is yet to be rolled out.
We are entering a period of the testing of novel economic policy propositions and the results will be interesting. First, to what extent are the policy goals of national self-sufficiency achievable in the age of globalisation. Put another way, to what extent can deglobalisation occur? Second, can advanced economies successfully reindustrialise. What will be the impact of industrial policies on their services sector? Third, GEW is starting to have an impact on the civil population – inflation, rising interest rates, shortages and migration pressures which were already struggling to cope with widening inequalities and a long-term pandemic. This has triggered worker unrest and a political backlash in several developed countries. Can developed countries stay on their current geopolitical course?
Fourth, developed countries are hitting fiscal and monetary constraints given their large fiscal deficits and over-extended central bank balance sheets. The prerequisite for an OECD economic recovery is whether they can re-leverage balance sheets. I think domestically they are tapped out (i.e. QE is no longer viable). Therefore, the OECD needs the rest of the world to purchase OECD-denominated assets. But can OECD re-leveraging take place when there is de-dollarisation? In the absence of non-OECD accumulation of their currencies, they will face difficulty in financing their deficits. The alternative to the financing dilemma is for OECD governments to reduce fiscal spending but the economic and political outcomes may be too painful to bear.
We are at the beginning of a transition from a unipolar to a multipolar, rather than a bipolar, world. During this transition, the geopolitical environment is toxic. Adversaries find it difficult to engage, let alone negotiate. Countries and MNCs are learning it does not pay to rely on adversaries and are distrustful. National self-interests will play a key role in shaping the new geopolitical boundaries.
Arta Moeini, David Polansky, Coleman Hopkins (16 September 2022) “Toward a phenomenology of the U.S. alliance system: Boon or a scourge on America’s national interest?” The Institute for Peace and Diplomacy. https://peacediplomacy.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Toward-a-Phenomenology-of-the-U.S.-Alliance-System.pdf
Cheng Yawen (6 February 2022) “Building the New Three Rings: China’s choice in the face of possible complete decoupling”. Originally published in Culture Vertical (June 2022). https://readchina.info/en-US/articles/586615452688449537
Phuah Eng Chye (2015) Policy paradigms for the anorexic and financialised economy: Managing the transition to an information society. http://www.amazon.com/dp/B01AWRAKJG
Phuah Eng Chye (5 June 2021) “Global reset – Two whales in a pond”. http://economicsofinformationsociety.com/global-reset-two-whales-in-a-pond/
Phuah Eng Chye (4 June 2022) “Theories on war and diplomacy (Part 1: Conflict theories)”. http://economicsofinformationsociety.com/theories-on-war-and-diplomacy-part-1-conflict-theories/
Phuah Eng Chye (18 June 2022) “Theories on war and diplomacy (Part 2: Integrated and ambiguous warfare)”. http://economicsofinformationsociety.com/theories-on-war-and-diplomacy-part-2-integrated-and-ambiguous-warfare/
Phuah Eng Chye (2 July 2022) “Theories on war and diplomacy (Part 3: Conflict in the information realm)”. http://economicsofinformationsociety.com/theories-on-war-and-diplomacy-part-3-conflict-in-the-information-realm/
Phuah Eng Chye (30 July 2022) “The Great Economic War (GEW) (Part 1: The beginning)”. http://economicsofinformationsociety.com/the-great-economic-war-gew-part-1-the-beginning/
Phuah Eng Chye (13 August 2022) “The Great Economic War (GEW) (Part 2: Strategic concepts and implications)”. http://economicsofinformationsociety.com/the-great-economic-war-gew-part-2-strategic-concepts-and-implications/
Phuah Eng Chye (27 August 2022) “The Great Economic War (GEW) (Part 3: The financial nuclear bomb)”. http://economicsofinformationsociety.com/the-great-economic-war-gew-part-3-the-financial-nuclear-bomb/
Phuah Eng Chye (10 September 2022) “The Great Economic War (GEW) (Part 4: Battles reshaping the global monetary order)”. http://economicsofinformationsociety.com/the-great-economic-war-gew-part-4-battles-reshaping-the-global-monetary-order/
Phuah Eng Chye (24 September 2022) “The Great Economic War (GEW) (Part 5: Global economic breakdown and monetary disorder)”. http://economicsofinformationsociety.com/the-great-economic-war-gew-part-5-global-economic-breakdown-and-monetary-disorder/
Phuah Eng Chye (8 October 2022) “The Great Economic War (GEW) (Part 6: Geopolitics, monetary policy challenges and the collapsing tripod)”. http://economicsofinformationsociety.com/the-great-economic-war-gew-part-6-geopolitics-monetary-policy-challenges-and-the-collapsing-tripod/
Phuah Eng Chye (22 October 2022) “The Great Economic War (GEW) (Part 7: Global depression and deglobalisation)”. http://economicsofinformationsociety.com/the-great-economic-war-gew-part-7-global-depression-and-deglobalisation/
Phuah Eng Chye (5 November 2022) “The Great Economic War (GEW) (Part 8: Lawfare)”. http://economicsofinformationsociety.com/the-great-economic-war-gew-part-8-lawfare/
Phuah Eng Chye (19 November 2022) “The Great Economic War (GEW) (Part 9: The geopoliticisation of MNCs)”. http://economicsofinformationsociety.com/the-great-economic-war-gew-part-9-geopoliticisation-of-mncs/
Phuah Eng Chye (3 December 2022) “The Great Economic War (GEW) (Part 10: The semiconductor technology battlefront)”. http://economicsofinformationsociety.com/the-great-economic-war-gew-part-10-the-semiconductor-technology-battlefront/
Phuah Eng Chye (17 December 2022) “The Great Economic War (GEW) (Part 11: Differences between Cold War 1.0 and 2.0)”. http://economicsofinformationsociety.com/the-great-economic-war-gew-part-11-differences-between-cold-war-1-0-and-2-0/
Philip Pilkington (17 November 2022) “America’s Suez moment”. The American Conservative. https://www.theamericanconservative.com/americas-suez-moment/
Rajan Menon (15 November 2022) “How Russia’s war busted the myth of universality”. TomDispatch. https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/11/15/how-russias-war-in-ukraine-has-hurt-efforts-to-fight-climate-change/
Samuel Gardner-Bird (15 November 2022) “The unipolar moment is over. When will the US get it?” Responsible Statecraft.
Sergey Glazyev (27 March 2022) “Events like these only happen once every century”. Business Online Magazine. https://thesaker.is/events-like-these-only-happen-once-every-century-sergey-glazyev/
 See “Theories on war and diplomacy (Part 2: Integrated and ambiguous warfare)”.
 Old Chinese saying.